UNTO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD JUSTICE GENERAL, THE LORD JUSTICE CLERK AND LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF JUSTICIARY

LORD ADVOCATE'S REFERENCE UNDER SECTION 123(1) OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT 1995

in

HIS MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE

against

HUMBLY SHEWETH:

- 1. That the facts which give rise to this Reference are as follows.
- 2. The accused was indicted in the High Court of Justiciary a charge of rape. The charge read:

"on 10 June 2022 at	, Edinburgh you	did assault
, c/o Police Service of Scotland		and did remove her shoes,
seize her on the body, seize her hair and neck,	push her head to the grou	nd, restrain her, remove her
tights and underwear, struggle with her and rep	peatedly penetrate her vag	ina with your penis, and you
did thus rape her, to her injury: CONTRARY to	Section 1 of the Sexual Of	ffences (Scotland) Act 2009."

3. The case proceeded to trial from 20 to 29 November 2023 and concluded with a majority verdict of not proven.

4. The accused and complainer, met in the Bourbon nightclub in
Edinburgh city centre. They left the nightclub together and walked to
5. gave evidence that they climbed into so that the
accused could urinate in one of the bushes. Whilst in the bushes together, she tripped and fell
on the ground. The accused told her she looked good in that position. She laughed at this
until the accused started taking her shoes and tights off. She told him she was menstruating
and did not want anything to happen. gave evidence that the accused pushed her
face into mud on the ground and raped her, once from behind and then, after pushing her
onto her back, from the front, whilst holding one hand over her mouth. After ejaculating, he
left her in the bushes. shouted for help, but no one came, so she left the gardens,
wearing no shoes or underwear, and sought help from passers-by on
6. The police were called and the accused was arrested the following evening as he
attempted to enter the same nightclub.
7. In addition to evidence, the Crown led the following adminicles of
evidence:
(i) CCTV footage of the accused and complainer kissing together in the nightclub (this to
rebut the accused's evidence that lovebites on his neck were obtained during the incident in
).
(ii) CCTV footage of the accused's walking around the city centre alone after the incident
(this to rebut the accused's account that he had left so quickly because he wanted
to meet his friend).
(iii) Evidence from the two passers-by, as to
extreme distress and dishevelment when she sought their help on
from the attending police officers, who gave evidence that remained distressed until

she was taken home at 6 or 7 am the next morning; and from the medical examiner who observed her to be distressed and anxious several hours later.

(iv)	de recenti statements to and the police officers
that	she had been raped.
(v)	Medical evidence of injuries to both the complainer and accused.
(vi)	Photographs of underwear, showing blood, which the police recovered
from	the gardens, with her trainers, sunglasses and disposable vape.
	The accused gave evidence that the sexual intercourse was consensual; penetration and finding of the accused's semen on endocervical and perianal swabs were ed by joint minute.
9.	In her speech to the jury, the Advocate Depute relied on evidence and the
adm	inicles of evidence at paragraph 7 above. She also stated that, if the jury were satisfied
that	what had said to was so soon after the event that
her v	words were intimately bound up with what had happened in the gardens, then they, the
jury,	would be entitled to treat that evidence as corroborative, even if they did not have the
evid	ence of distress and dishevelment when she said those things.
10.	In his charge to the jury, the learned trial judge directed the jury that this was wrong
and	asked the jury to disregard it. The distress shown to the passers-by and police was
corro	oborative; the de recenti statements served only to enhance the strength of the distress
evid	ence.

A point of law thus arose in relation to the charge of rape in this trial: whether a de

recenti statement on its own is corroborative. This point of law requires the authoritative

11.

determination of the Court.

- 12. The Lord Advocate accordingly refers this point of law for your Lordships' and Ladyships' opinion, in the form of the following questions:
- (1) Is a *de recenti* statement on its own corroborative? That is, is a *de recenti* statement corroborative even in the absence of distress?
- (2) If a *de recenti* statement refers (directly or by inference) to the accused as being responsible for the crime, can it corroborate the complainer's subsequent evidence both that the crime libelled was committed and that it was the accused who committed it?
- (3) If a *de recenti* statement on its own is corroborative, at what point in time or in what circumstances does that statement stop being corroborative and become inadmissible hearsay?
- (4) Was *Morton v HM Advocate* 1938 JC 50 wrong in holding (*per* LJC (Aitchison) at 53) that a *de recenti* statement is admissible as bearing upon credibility only and that the statements of an injured party, although made *de recenti* of the commission of a crime, do not in law amount to corroboration? If so, should *Morton* be overruled?

MAY IT THEREFORE PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIPS/ LADYSHIPS:

- (i) to order service of this Reference upon the persons designed in the schedule appended hereto;
- (ii) to fix a date for the hearing of this Reference, and to order intimation of said date to said persons;
- (iii) upon consideration of these present, to answer the point of law submitted for the opinion of your Lordships/Ladyships; and

[OVER]

(iv) to do further or otherwise as to your Lordships/Ladyships shall seem proper.

ACCORDING TO JUSTICE

DOROTHY R BAIN KC, LORD ADVOCATE

PAUL HARVEY, AD

DOMINIC SCULLION,
ADVOCATE

SCHEDULE OF SERVICE

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